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Abstract
Indirect reciprocity, a key concept in behavioral experiments and evolutionary game theory, provides a mechanism that
allows reciprocal altruism to emerge in a population of self-regarding individuals even when repeated interactions between
pairs of actors are unlikely. Recent empirical evidence show that humans typically follow complex assessment strategies
involving both reciprocity and social imitation when making cooperative decisions. However, currently, we have no
systematic understanding of how imitation, a mechanism that may also generate negative effects via a process of
cumulative advantage, affects cooperation when repeated interactions are unlikely or information about a recipient’s
reputation is unavailable. Here we extend existing evolutionary models, which use an image score for reputation to track
how individuals cooperate by contributing resources, by introducing a new imitative-trust score, which tracks whether
actors have been the recipients of cooperation in the past. We show that imitative trust can co-exist with indirect reciprocity
mechanisms up to a threshold and then cooperation reverses -revealing the elusive nature of cooperation. Moreover, we
find that when information about a recipient’s reputation is limited, trusting the action of third parties towards her (i.e.
imitating) does favor a higher collective cooperation compared to random-trusting and share-alike mechanisms. We believe
these results shed new light on the factors favoring social imitation as an adaptive mechanism in populations of
cooperating social actors.
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Introduction
The evolution of cooperative behavior in biological and human
populations has been shown to rely critically on different forms of
reciprocity [1–6]. In human society, cultural transmission
mechanisms such as language allow for a subtle cooperative
structure based on the principle of indirect reciprocity. In the
absence of previous direct interactions which can be used to judge
an individual, it is possible to observe and record the interactions
of that individual with third parties [7,8], and assign a reputation
to the individual guided by the principle: if I scratch your back,
someone else will scratch mine [9]. Simulation models in which a
reputation score associated with each actor records previous
decisions about whether to cooperate or not, have revealed that
indirect reciprocity among actors in a population will emerge
particularly if all individuals have access to the reputation scores of
other individuals [10–12].
However, when information about the past record of other
individuals is unavailable or unreliable, laboratory experiments
[13–20] and simulation models [14,21–23] have shown that actors
might rely instead on imitation mechanisms or recognition
heuristics to share resources with other actors they interact with
according to their counterpart’s trustworthiness. In fact, recent
work has shown that cooperative behavior can spread as an
imitation and trust mechanism across a population of self-
regarding individuals [24]. The trustworthiness can be assigned
to actors on the basis of how many third parties signal that they
endorse a given actor, and as such is used as a proxy for the
attributes of an individual when there is no detailed record of how
those actors have acted towards others in the past [17,18,25,26].
This is to say, an actor C will extend trust to A (i.e. cooperate with
A), because B previously extended trust to A, and in the absence of
further information the trustworthiness of A can be used as part of
a frugal heuristic or referral mechanisms by C [20,24,27,28].
Although reliance on imitation strategies can provide a heuristic
that allows the identification of potentially trustworthy partners in
interactions, there can be a negative impact on overall welfare
since the resulting distribution of resources can reflect the principle
of cumulative advantage [25,29–31]. Following this principle
implies that the distribution of resources across actors in a
population becomes increasingly skewed over time, with the rich
getting richer and the poor getting poorer. Similarly, imitation
strategies have proved extremely successful when applied to
competitive strategies [32,33]. Here we explore how actors use
different assessment attributes based on imitation and indirect
reciprocity mechanisms to decide whom they cooperate with, and
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who gains resources when repeated interactions are unlikely. We
answer the questions of whether imitation and indirect reciprocity
mechanisms can co-exist and generate collective cooperation, and
whether imitation provides a reliable alternative to indirect
reciprocity when information about an actor’s reputation is
frequently unavailable. In general, why is imitation a recurrent
mechanism in human behavior given its potential negative effects
on the distribution of resources in a population?
Results
The model
In our imitation-reciprocity (IR) model, we consider individuals
faced with a social dilemma [1,9,34,35], who follow cooperative or
altruistic strategies involving both reciprocity and imitation
mechanisms [24,27,28]. Here, the donor has the opportunity to
help a randomly chosen recipient at cost c, while the recipient gets
a benefit b. Otherwise, the donor and recipient remain with their
current payoff [10]. Hence, the donor faces a dilemma about
whether to cooperate or not. However, we assume that non-
cooperative actions harm the reputation and trust of the donor
and recipient respectively. For reputation, we follow the image-
scoring mechanism proposed in [10], where the image r of a donor
is continually assessed according to their previous cooperative or
non-cooperative actions towards other possible recipients in the
population. Similarly, for imitative trust, a recipient’s image t is
continually assessed according to the cooperative or non-
cooperative actions received from possible donors. Hence, the
trust score of a recipient only records information about the action
of third parties towards her. Donors have their own assessment
strategies Ti and Ri for trust and reputation images respectively. A
positive image of a recipient j always will make it more likely that a
donor i will help than a negative image given by tj§Ti or rj§Ri.
This corresponds to the behavior of actors who have access to the
reputation of potential recipients, and social actors using imitative
strategies, who only have access to or are influenced by the
trustworthiness of such recipients. The access to information is
given by a threshold parameter p, which determines whether
donors evaluate the reputation, with probability 1{p, or the
trustworthiness of recipients, with a probability p. In our
simulations, we consider n actors, which are replaced at the end
of each generation m and transmit their strategies to the new
population in proportion to their accumulated payoffs (Methods).
In each generation, N randomly pair-wise interactions are chosen,
where actors can play either the role of donors or recipients, i.e.
2N=n interactions per actor (see Methods for a detailed
description of the IR model).
Imitation and indirect reciprocity
First, we analyze the effects of using imitative trust as an
alternative mechanism to indirect reciprocity. We find that the
collective payoff generated by indirect reciprocity is surprisingly
robust to high levels of imitation. As illustrated in Figure 1A, we
find that for most of the simulated levels of imitation pƒ0:7, the
average payoff per actor, calculated across the generation once the
population has fixated into a common strategy, is higher than half
of the maximum possible (i.e. payoff~45). However, the average
payoff considerably decreases as imitation becomes the only
strategy followed by actors (i.e. payoff&1), revealing the elusive
nature of cooperation. Similarly, analyzing the fixated strategies
reached by the population in the last generation, we find that on
average both imitative T (solid red line) and indirect reciprocity R
(blue dashed line) strategies become non-cooperative (w0) at a
high level of imitation p~0:8 (see Fig. 1B). This suggests that only
when imitation is used less than 80% as an assessment strategy,
cooperative behavior dominates and the population achieve
higher payoffs.
Additionally, we explore to what extent trusting the actions of
others provides better cooperative outcomes than plausible
alternative strategies. Our first alternative strategy or null
hypothesis is a random-trusting process, where we assume that
donors apply a simple probabilistic rule and cooperate on average
50% of the time. This is to say, when information about a
recipient’s reputation is unavailable p percent of the time, donors
apply a simple random process and cooperate on average one out
of two opportunities. For the second null hypothesis, we assume
that donors follow a share-alike behavior, where they try to
distribute benefits equally among all members in the population
[36,37]. Here, donors cooperate if the trustworthiness (i.e.
Figure 1. Imitative trust and indirect reciprocity. Panel A and B show, respectively, the average payoff per actor and the average strategies T
(solid red line) andR (dashed blue line) observed in the population across different levels of imitation p (x-axis). Bars correspond to 2 standard deviations.
Values are calculated over 1000 simulations considering the generation when the population has reached a fixated common strategy T , R.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013475.g001
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previous granted cooperation) of the recipient is low and defect if
the trustworthiness is high (see Methods for details). Figure 2 shows
that under intermediate levels of limited information 0:2ƒpƒ0:7,
random-trusting (green dashed line) processes and share-alike
mechanisms (orange dashed line) display on average lower payoffs
than imitative trust (black line). This reveals that trusting the
action of others could be a useful alternative mechanism to
indirect reciprocity when donors do not have frequent access to
the reputation of potential recipients.
Vulnerability of cooperative strategies
To examine the vulnerability of different strategies on
distributing equal number of resources to all members in the
population, we investigate the effect of noise in the allocation of
resources. We measure the distribution of payoffs in the
population generated by changing the parameter p and introduc-
ing small errors in the decision-making process of donors [11].
This noise in the allocation of resources takes into account
important effects such as memory constraints, bias in judgments or
implementation errors [38–42]. We implement this by allowing
donors to randomly change their decision with a small, fixed
probability E [11]. Here we consider that one out of ten times a
donor can make an implementation or decision error (E~0:1).
Smaller values of e generate similar results. Note that without this
noise we would expect all actors with the same amount of
resources.
To measure the distribution of payoffs in the population, we use
the Gini coefficient [43]. The Gini coefficient represents the average
difference in wealth share for two actors in the population normalized
to fall between 0 (perfect equality) and 1 (maximum inequality). The
Gini coefficient is defined as G~
Pn
i~1
Pn
j~1 Dqi{qjD=2n, where
qi~ui=
Pn
k~1 uk, and ui is the payoff of actor i, and n is the total
number of actors in the population. Since payoffs can be negative, we
take the minimum value as the baseline payoff equal to 1 and adjust
all other payoffs accordingly. Figure 3A shows that under pure
indirect reciprocity (p~0), the population always favors
cooperative strategies Rƒ0 with low Gini coefficients. Interest-
ingly, Figure 3B shows that even when imitation and indirect
reciprocity mechanisms are used equally p~0:5, the population
has a high likelihood (&%70) of converging into cooperative
strategies with low Gini coefficients (bottom left corner). By
contrast, Figures 3C–D show that cooperators disappear and
high Gini coefficients emerge at the point when imitation
dominates the assessment mechanism in the population. Note
that the highest Gini coefficients are reached when the
population follows a trust-based cooperative strategy T~0
combined with a reputation-based unconditional defector
strategy R~6. This shows that populations that only cooperate
using imitation mechanisms are highly prone to inequality
effects [25,29–31].
Emergence of cooperation
Finally, we investigate whether imitative trust and indirect
reciprocity can co-exist and allow the emergence of reciprocal
altruism. We explore how cooperation would evolve through
mutations in a population of unconditional defectors. For each
actor, we introduce a third dimension p. For simplicity we assume
it can take three different values 0, 0:5 and 1, which correspond
to the proportion of imitative trust used by actors, i.e. this
dimension replaces the probability of using imitative trust caused
by limited information in our original model (see Methods). We
initialize the population with all actors having p~0, R~6 and a
random strategy T , i.e. at the beginning actors only use indirect
reciprocity strategies defined by unconditional defectors. To
investigate the evolution of imitative trust and cooperation, we
include mutations in the creation of new generations. We assume
a small probability h~0:001 [10] that a new actor adopts a
randomly chosen strategy (T , R and p) than the one inherited by
her parent.
First, our simulations show endless cycles of collective
cooperation and defection. Figure 4A shows that the average
payoff per actor per generation continuously fluctuates between
45, the maximum value, and 0, the minimum value. Second, we
observe that imitative trust can, in fact, co-exist with indirect
reciprocity. Figure 4B shows the percentage of actors with either
p~0 (blue), p~0:5 (green) and p~1 (red) across thousands of
generations for a single simulation. The population continuously
fluctuates between all the different strategies. Similar results hold if
we only use p~0 and p~1. Note that the population never settles
in a stable strategy. These results suggest that cooperation emerges
only if indirect reciprocity is present; however, once this
requirement is fulfilled, imitation can provide a plausible
alternative strategy.
Discussion
It has been argued that cultural transmission mechanisms
make it possible to assign a measure of reputation or social status
to specific individuals in a population, so that cooperation can
emerge in human societies as a consequence of indirect
reciprocity [9,10]. However, the effects of reputation and social
status do not necessarily coincide, and therefore are likely to
warrant separate treatment. The evaluation of reputation takes
into account the record of past actions of an individual, while
social status reflects social preferences and mechanisms such as
copying the helping behaviour of others [44]. Social experiments
have shown that the actions and opinions of others used as a
proxy for quality or reputation can affect someone’s popularity or
commitment to cooperate [18,24]. If we assume that actors are
Figure 2. Alternative cooperative mechanisms to imitation. The
figure compares the average payoff per actor (see Fig. 1A) generated by
imitative trust (black line) against the average payoff obtained by
replacing imitative trust with random-trusting (green dashed line) and
share-alike (red dashed line) mechanisms. Values are calculated over
1000 simulations considering the generation when the population has
reached a fixated common strategy T , R.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013475.g002
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heterogeneous in this regard, then it is useful to model
populations so that individuals vary in how they attend to these
two types of information, and hence to allow for different
combinations of reputation and imitative trust mechanisms.
Although there is no difference in principle with regard to the
cognitive demands imposed by each mechanism, there may also
be asymmetries between the availability or quality of information
associated with giving help and receiving help in a given social
setting. Methodologically, the addition of imitative trust to the
original indirect reciprocity model restores balance to how
information on donors and recipients is treated. Each pairwise
interaction between a donor and recipient encodes information
about both parties, which the combination of image and
imitative-trust scores fully captures.
Here we have analyzed for the first time the effects that two
assessment mechanisms –imitation and indirect reciprocity, which
determine the structure of who cooperates with whom and who
gains resources, might generate when access to the reputation of
potential recipients is frequently unavailable or actors are
influenced by the cooperative action of others. We have found
that both the cooperative behavior and the fair allocation of
resources decrease as the use of imitation mechanisms increases.
However, we have also found that as long as actors use imitation
and indirect reciprocity mechanisms equally, cooperative strategies
Figure 3. Vulnerability of cooperative strategies. We analyze the vulnerability of imitation and indirect reciprocity strategies on distributing
similar resources when actors are subject to implementation errors. We introduce a probability e~0:1 that donors mistakenly act in the opposite way
as it was expected from their strategy. Note that without errors we would expect all actors with the same amount of resources. Panels A–D show the
correlation between Gini coefficients (shades) and the frequency of fixated strategies (circles) for p~0, p~0:5, p~0:8 and p~1 respectively. Gini
coefficients and frequencies are reported as the average over 105 simulations considering the generation when the population has reached a fixated
common strategy T , R. The frequency of occurrence for each strategy is proportional to the area of the circles.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013475.g003
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dominate and resource inequalities are small. Surprisingly, we
have observed that trusting the action of others generates higher
payoffs than simple random-trusting processes and share-alike
mechanisms. This suggests that imitation might be in fact an
adaptive mechanism in populations of cooperating social actors
under limited information.
Materials and Methods
IR Model
We study reciprocal altruism under imitative trust and indirect
reciprocity. Specifically, we consider n actors over a fixed lifetime,
which are replaced at the end of each generation m. In each
generation, N randomly pair-wise interactions are chosen, where
actors can play either the role of donors or recipients (i.e. 2N=n
interactions per actor). If a donor i cooperates with a recipient j,
the donor pays a cost c and the recipient gets a benefit b.
Otherwise, if the donor does not cooperate, both payoffs remain
exactly the same. A donor i decides whether to cooperate or not
based on the recipient’s image and her own assessment strategy.
The image of a recipient j is assessed either by her trust score tj or
reputation score ri, where both can take integer values in ½{5,5
following the standard convention of reference [10]. A tunable
parameter p gives the probability that the donor evaluates the
recipient’s trust score and with probability 1{p the donor
evaluates the recipient’s reputation score. In addition, a donor i
has her own assessment strategies Ti and Ri, drawn from a
uniform distribution in ½{5,6, for trust and reputation respec-
tively. Therefore, the model comprises 144 different strategies.
According to whether the donor evaluates the recipient’s
trustworthiness or reputation, cooperation will be established if
the recipient’s image is above a certain threshold given by tj§Ti
or rj§Ri for trustworthiness and reputation respectively. If
cooperation is established, the donor’s reputation ri is increased
by one unit, else her reputation decreases by one unit. In addition,
each time the recipient receives cooperation her trustworthiness tj
is increased by one unit, else her trustworthiness decreases by one
unit. Note that the increase and decrease of scores is subject to the
boundary conditions of the score values ½{5,5. This score
boundary allows the presence of unconditional cooperators
T~R~{5 and unconditional defectors T~R~6. At the end
of its lifetime, the population is replaced by a new generation,
where an old actor i can transmit her assessment strategies T-R to
a new actor k, with a probability wi proportional to her own
payoff and relative to the payoffs of all actors j in the population
[45]. Mathematically, this is given by wi~ui=
Pn
j uj , where ui is
the payoff of actor i. Since payoffs can be negative, we take the
minimum value as the baseline payoff equal to 1 and adjust all
other payoffs accordingly. If not stated otherwise, all generations
start with ti~ri~ui~0 for all actors i. Simulations were
performed using conventional parameter values [10,11]:
m~500, N~500, n~100, c~1 and b~10. We also extended
our model for large populations with up to n~106 actors and
found similar results.
Share-alike mechanism
According to whether the donor evaluates the recipient’s trust
or reputation scores, cooperation will be established if the
recipient’s image is below a certain threshold given by tjƒTi or
rj§Ri for trust and reputation respectively.
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Figure 4. Emergence of cooperation. To investigate the emergence of cooperation and the co-existence of imitation and indirect reciprocity, we
consider that new actors will adopt a randomly chosen strategy with probability h~0:001 (see text). Additionally, to differentiate between actors
using only indirect reciprocity, imitation or a mix of the two, we introduce a third dimension p that takes values of 0 (blue line), 1 (red line), or 0:5
(green line) respectively. We initialize the population with p~0 and R~6, i.e. unconditional defectors. Panel A shows the average payoff per actors
per generation for a single simulation. Note that the population continuously fluctuate between maximum cooperation and defection. Panel B shows
that the strategies p also fluctuate across generations. This reveals that although there is no stable strategy, actors can adopt cooperative imitative
and indirect reciprocity strategies.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013475.g004
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